Derestricted 21 November 2024

(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 21 November 2024)



Board of Governors

GOV/2024/68

Date: 21 November 2024

Original: English

For official use only

Item 5(f) of the adopted agenda (GOV/2024/67)

NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Resolution adopted on 21 November 2024 during the 1746th session

The Board of Governors,

- (a) <u>Commending</u> the continued professional, independent and impartial efforts of the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat, including its inspectors, to implement Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement,
- (b) <u>Emphasizing</u> the essential and independent role of the IAEA in verifying Iran's compliance with its NPT-required safeguards obligations,
- (c) <u>Stressing</u> the importance of Iran's compliance with its safeguards obligations and the need for Iran to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the Agency with a view to clarifying and resolving the long outstanding safeguards issues detailed in the Director General's report GOV/2024/62 and in several prior reports,
- (d) <u>Noting</u> the Director General's deep concern that undeclared nuclear material had been present at several undeclared locations in Iran and that its current location(s) are not known to the Agency, and his assessment that nuclear material used in Iran was not declared as required under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement,
- (e) <u>Recalling</u> Iran's continued failure to implement modified Code 3.1, contrary to the legal obligations that it had accepted in 2003 and which it cannot modify or suspend unilaterally, and Iran's failure to provide the Agency with design and preliminary design information regarding new and planned nuclear facilities, as required under modified Code 3.1,
- (f) <u>Noting</u> the Director General's conclusion that the material balance of the uranium involved in undeclared uranium metal production experiments conducted at JHL in 1995-2000 includes an amount of nuclear material unaccounted for,
- (g) Recalling the Board of Governors' resolutions of 19 June 2020 contained in GOV/2020/34, of 8 June 2022 contained in GOV/2022/34, and of 17 November 2022 contained in GOV/2022/70

which called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and decided that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding issues, take all specified actions without delay,

- (h) Recalling the most recent Board of Governors' resolution of 5 June 2024 contained in GOV/2024/39 which considered that a continued failure by Iran to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous co-operation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, may necessitate the production, by the Director General, of a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program,
- (i) <u>Deeply regretting</u> that despite the above resolutions by the Board and many opportunities provided by the Director General over five years, Iran has neither provided the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran nor informed the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment, and that instead stated it has declared all of the nuclear material and activities required under its Safeguards Agreement, which is inconsistent with the Agency's findings,
- (j) <u>Noting</u> that, notwithstanding Iran's statements, the Agency has not changed its assessment of the undeclared nuclear-related activities that took place at four undeclared locations in Iran, nor of the origin of the uranium particles of anthropogenic origin,
- (k) <u>Underscoring</u> the Director General's conclusion that unless and until Iran provides technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations and informs the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or contaminated equipment, the Agency cannot confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement,
- (l) <u>Noting</u> with serious concern the Director General's conclusion that these issues stem from Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful,
- (m) <u>Supporting</u> the Director General's ongoing efforts, including through the high level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran on 14 November 2024, to obtain progress from Iran on resolving outstanding safeguards issues and improving cooperation with the Agency, including through the full implementation of the Joint statement between the IAEA and Iran of 4 March 2023, recalling that both sides have recognised that such engagements could pave the way for wider agreements among parties,
- 1. <u>Strongly supports</u> the Agency's continued efforts to implement Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, with the aim to provide assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;
- 2. <u>Reiterates</u> its profound concern that Iran has still not provided necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency and has not taken the essential and urgent actions as decided by the Board in its June 2024 resolution, with the consequence that safeguards issues remain outstanding despite numerous interactions with the Agency since 2019, with serious implications for the Agency's ability to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

- 3. <u>Underscores</u> Iran's obligation to implement modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation, and provide all necessary design and preliminary design information to the Agency;
- 4. <u>Reaffirms its decision</u> that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues, take the following actions without delay:
 - i. <u>Provide</u> technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran,
 - ii. <u>Inform</u> the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,
 - iii. Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose,
 - iv. <u>Provide access to locations</u> and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.
- 5. <u>Underlines</u> that the provision by Iran of this information and access and the subsequent verification by the IAEA pursuant to Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement is essential for the Secretariat to be in position to report the issues as no longer outstanding and thereby remove the need for the Board's consideration and action on these issues;
- 6. Requests the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, including a full account of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA on these issues, addressing the Agency's ability to verify Iran's implementation of its safeguards obligations including the non-diversion of nuclear material, based on all information available, for consideration by the March 2025 Board of Governors or at the latest by spring 2025;
- 7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.