Thank you very much. It's a great honor to be here
at SAIS [School
of Advanced International Studies]. I've been fortunate to count a lot of SAIS graduates and SAIS faculty
among my friends, indeed, I see many friends and colleagues in the audience.
Thanks for being here. This is a place that is synonymous with professionalism,
with hard work, and with influence on the important issues of foreign and defense
policy around the world.
I've been told that this speech is also being broadcast live on the worldwide
web, and so for those of you who are sitting in your offices or your home, or
even at a classroom in Nanjing or in Bologna, welcome, and thanks for taking the
time to tune in.
I'd like to thank Steve Szabo very much, the Interim Dean of SAIS, for the
opportunity to be here. Jessica Einhorn, the Dean Designate and a good friend;
congratulations on your recent appointment, Jessica. To Bill Brody, the
President of Johns Hopkins, and his wife, Wendy, who leave this university so
very, very well, thank you. To Dorothy Rostov and Gene Rostov, the widow and son
of Charles Rostov, thank you for sponsoring this lecture. As a former provost, I
know how important it is to have that kind of support.
To Paul Nitze and his wife, Leezee, it's an honor to have you here. Not only are
you good friends, but Paul, your decades of service and your visionary work in
containing the Soviet Union and giving America a vision that was transformative
and that was realized 50 years later is something that George Shultz has perhaps
put best, that "wise men come and wise men go, but one wise man goes on and on."
And, Paul, we're very glad for that.
Zbig Brzezinski,
also a former National Security Advisor -- we have a little club that we hold. Zbig, it's nice to have you here. And to Cliff
Wharton, who is a good friend and a graduate of SAIS, as well to the members of
the Advisory Council, thank you very much for this opportunity.
As Steve said, I was originally scheduled to be here on September 11th, and I
thought I would speaking. Instead, I ended up, after a few hours in a White
House bunker, trying to deal with the effects of a huge terrorist attack on the
United States. None of us will ever forget where we were when we heard the news
that particular day.
I, myself, was standing at my desk in the White House, and I was waiting to go
down to my senior staff meeting, when my executive assistant handed me a note
that said that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. And my first thought was,
what a terrible accident. And I called the President and he said essentially the
same thing, he was in Florida, he said, what a terrible accident.
And, of course, first reports are always wrong. First we thought it was a twin
engine plane, and then later we learned it was a commercial airliner. And I went
down for my senior staff meeting and about three people into the staff meeting,
as I was asking for reports, I got a note from my executive assistant that said
a second plane has hit the World Trade Center. And I thought, my God, it's a
terrorist attack.
And I walked into the Situation Room to try to gather together the national
security principals for a session, a meeting, and I was trying to reach Don
Rumsfeld and I couldn't. And I looked behind me, and a plane had hit the
Pentagon. And there were reports that there were car bombs at the State
Department and that airplanes were headed for the White House.
It is one of those events that foreign policy professionals spend their lives
talking about and thinking about and studying -- and perhaps even exercising
for, as I'm one who believes in teaching from decision simulations -- but you
hope to God that you'll never actually face it.
Indeed, we did face it, as a country and as a world. In the hours and days that
followed, the President set the broad outlines of a strategy to address what had
happened to us. And, of course, as a part of that, he ordered the Pentagon to
quickly develop a military strategy for Afghanistan, which was obviously the
center, the home base from which this attack had taken place.
Now, that plan was truly outside the box for the simple reason that the American
military did not have on the shelf a plan that said: your ground forces will be
on horseback, but they'll be complemented by 21st century air power. It took a
little, shall we say, adaptive planning to figure out exactly how to make that
work. But we quickly did adapt to the new conditions that faced us. And the
President, who wanted to use America's military forces deliberately but
decisively, was able to do so.
The results speak for themselves: al Qaeda has been deprived of its home base;
its leadership is on the run; many of its operatives have been captured or
killed; the Taliban regime has been routed; Afghanistan has been transformed
from a terrorist-sponsored state into a country led by people who are trying to
create a better future.
There remains much work to be done on many fronts, from military operations to
law enforcement to intelligence sharing to cutting off terrorist financing. The
war on terrorism has many aspects, not just military aspects, and we are
pursuing them all. Patient and focused leadership has brought us thus far, and
we believe that it will carry us through to victory.
It's going to take years to understand the long-term effects of September 11th.
But even now we are beginning to recognize that there are certain verities that
September 11th reinforced and brought home to us in the most vivid way.
First, there has been an end to innocence about international politics and about
our own vulnerability. We see that wars of consequence are not mere relics of a
bygone era. We see that in years to come the primary energies of America's Armed
Forces will be devoted to more than just managing civil conflict and
humanitarian assistance.
As the world's most powerful nation, the United States has a special
responsibility to help make the world more secure. And when we were attacked on
September 11th, it reinforced one of the rediscovered truths about today's
world: robust military power matters in international politics and in security.
Second, the events of September 11th underscored the idea that a sound foreign
policy begins at home. We are now engaged in trying to harden the country. That
means thinking about airport security, visa requirements, protection of nuclear
power plants and other physical and cyber security infrastructure.
We also are working with the American Armed Forces to make certain that the role
of America's Armed Forces, in defending our territory, our airspace, our land
and our sea, is properly taken care of. And that is why Secretary Rumsfeld and
Chairman Myers have proposed the creation of a U.S. Northern Command -- having
America's Armed Forces cover for the first time the American continent, wholly
consistent with American constitutional responsibilities and expectations, but
with a new understanding that America's frontiers need to be safe.
In doing so, we recognize that we have to secure our own neighborhood, not just
America's borders. And we are now cooperating with Mexico and Canada in
unprecedented ways to construct smart and modern borders -- borders that protect
us from those who would harm us, but facilitate the trade and human interchange
that enrich us.
Since the earliest days of the campaign for President, President Bush has stated
his determination to build a fully democratic western hemisphere that lives and
trades in freedom and grows in prosperity. Strong, prosperous neighbors export
their goods, not their problems -- like drugs and terror.
The third truth is that we can only do so much to protect ourselves at home, and
so the best defense is a good offense. We have to take the fight to the
terrorists. And that means that there can be no distinction between terrorists
and those who harbor them. So in addition to pursuing al Qaeda, we have also
pursued the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan, as we knew that they had
shared responsibilities for the terrorist attacks.
Now with the Taliban out of power and al Qaeda damaged, we have moved into the
second stage of our war on terror. But let's be very clear: much remains to be
done in Afghanistan. Ultimately, Afghanistan will be secured by more democracy
and more prosperity. This great project is not America's alone and it will
require a broad range of tools. We need to help Afghanistan build up its
political institutions, its economic institutions and its civil society.
Building a nation is not an American military task -- it is a joint project, a
long-term project between the Afghan people and the international community.
Beyond Afghanistan, we are engaged in a sustained campaign to deny sanctuary to
terrorists, regardless of where they are from and where they commit their
crimes. Our message to every leader on every continent is that terrorism can
support no cause, it is never, never legitimate; it is, by its very nature,
evil; terrorists have no positive agenda; terrorists are not for anything, they
are against peace and freedom and life, itself.
Recent events in the Middle East illustrate the terrible damage, the terrible
toll of terrorism. Innocent lives are being lost. People who could be living
together in peace are being driven apart by death and destruction. And on April
4th, the President called on all parties -- Israel, the Palestinians and
regional leaders among the Arab neighbors -- to accept their responsibilities to
create an environment free from violence and terror.
A fourth truth that September 11th underscored was the need to deny terrorists
and hostile states the opportunity to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The
world's most dangerous people simply cannot be permitted to obtain the world's
most dangerous weapons. And it is a stubborn and extremely troubling fact that
the list of states that sponsor terror and the lists of states that are seeking
to acquire weapons of mass destruction overlap substantially.
We do not see how these facts can be denied. And if these facts are admitted,
they must be confronted. We must use every tool at our disposal to meet this
grave global threat, including strengthened nonproliferation regimes and export
controls, and moving ahead with missile defense to deny any benefit to those who
would try and acquire weapons of mass destruction.
The United States and our coalition partners must act deliberately. But inaction
is not an option. As the President has said, we must not and we will not wait on
events while dangers gather.
Finally, the new challenges have underscored the critical importance of allies,
partners and coalitions. Global terror demands a global solution. Right now
there are 20 countries with forces operating in and around Afghanistan, one of
the largest military coalitions assembled since the Gulf War. And there are many
who are not a part of the military coalition who are providing important
intelligence, law enforcement and efforts to cut off terrorist financing.
In this we have been tremendously helped by our allies around the world. And our
NATO allies have particularly led the way, especially Britain, which heads the
International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan and has sent air and
naval and special forces into the region. America will never forget that within
24 hours of the attacks, NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked
Article V of its charter, stating that an attack on one is an attack on all.
We will continue to work closely with our friends and our allies as the war
progresses and as we seek victory over the scourge of terrorism.
These enduring truths, made more vivid by September 11th, are very important to
centering our foreign policy. But there is one other important truth from this
period: an earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of
international politics. The international system has been in flux since the
collapse of Soviet power. Now it is possible -- indeed, probable -- that that
transition is coming to an end.
If that is right, if the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 bookend a major
shift in international politics, then this is a period not just of grave danger,
but of enormous opportunity. Before the clay is dry again, America and our
friends and our allies must move decisively to take advantage of these new
opportunities. This is, then, a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American
leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states -- Japan and
Germany among the great powers -- to create a new balance of power that favored
freedom.
It is, indeed, possible to see age-old problems in a new light. And, as an
academic, may I suggest, to put aside age-old distinctions between realism and
neoliberalism in thinking about the task ahead. Put more simply than any of its
proponents would find acceptable, realists downplay the importance of values and
the internal structures of states, emphasizing instead the balance of power as
the key to stability and peace. Neoliberals emphasize the primacy of values,
such as freedom and democracy and human rights and institutions in ensuring that
a just political order is obtained.
As a professor, I recognize that these debates enliven our conferences and our
classrooms. I have participated in them, myself. In fact, most of us
got tenure because we participated in them. But as a policymaker, I
can tell you that they obscure reality. Power matters. Great powers matter.
Great powers matter because they can influence international stability for good
or for ill due their size, influence and their will. Great powers never have,
and never will, just mind their own business within their borders.
Thus, the Soviet Union's collapse was important both because it resolved a
high-stakes struggle that profoundly affected world peace and security, but also
because values and ideas, democracy, markets and freedom triumphed. The
socialist alternative that had existed for 70-plus years, which kept so much of
the world isolated from the international economy and deprived so many millions
of the benefits of freedom, died alongside the hammer and the sickle.
Our goal today, then, is not just a favorable balance of power, but what
President Bush has called a balance of power that favors freedom.
After the end of the Cold War, and still in the shadow of September 11th, we may
well be on the cusp of an era in which the world will not be bedeviled by great
power rivalry. There will be differences among the great powers. But if the
scales tip toward shared interest, rather than interest in conflict between
them, this will truly be an era unlike any other.
September 11th and its aftermath illuminated a fundamental divide between the
forces of chaos and those of order. And all the world's great powers clearly see
themselves as falling on the same side of this divide, and they are acting
accordingly.
Europe and the United States see that our common and fundamental interests and
values far outweigh our differences. When people are trying to kill you, and
when they attack because they hate freedom, other disputes -- from Franken-food
to bananas to even important issues like the environment -- suddenly look a bit
different. They look like policy differences, not fundamental clashes of values.
Germany and Japan have begun to adopt new security roles that correspond with
their identities as leading powers and democracies. Russia's democratic
transition is by no means yet complete. Yet, September 11th has helped to
clarify elements of a common security agenda with Russia. We have also worked
cooperatively on a range of issues with India, an emerging democratic power,
even as we work closely with Pakistan. And we are optimistic about the future of
our relationship with China, a country in the midst of a fundamental and still
uncertain transition. But the emergence of a China that embraces the rule of
law, markets and, ultimately, democracy would have a profound and positive
effect on world security and prosperity.
A balance of power that favors freedom is, at its core, a balance of power based
on the ascendancy of shared values on every continent. That is why in places
such as Russia and China, values matter. They matter in our relations and they
matter to the outcome of the balance of power that favors freedom -- values like
religious freedom, media freedom and a recognition of the aspirations of long
suffering minority groups. It is not enough for the great powers to share an
interest in order; we need to move to sharing an interest in an order that is
based on common values.
America today possesses as much power and influence as any nation or entity in
the world, and certainly in history. But in stark contrast to the leading powers
of centuries past, our ambitions are not territorial. Our military and economic
power are complemented by and multiplied by the values that underpin them:
democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, honest government, respect
for women and children, private property, free speech, equal justice and
religious tolerance.
That is why America seeks a great world beyond the victory over terror. We seek
not merely to leave the world safer, but to leave it better; to leave it a world
that makes it possible for all men and women to experience the exhilaration and
the challenges of freedom. This mission to leave the world safer and better is
more important than ever in the face of September 11th. That is why President
Bush is strongly committed to free trade as a cornerstone of American policy --
trade that advances economic growth at home and abroad and advances the forces
of freedom, as well.
That is why in Monterrey, Mexico last month the President put forth a new
compact for global development defined by greater resources from wealthy nations
and greater responsibility from developing nations. That fund will benefit poor
countries, especially in Africa, but also in Latin America. The President
pledged to seek a 50 percent increase in America's core development assistance,
with new funds devoted to projects and nations that govern justly, invest in
their people and encourage economic freedom.
There is also a new urgency to address our relations with Muslim societies
around the world in a positive way. This war in which we are engaged is not a
clash of civilizations; it cannot be a clash of civilizations. Extremism and
progress are most assuredly enemies of one another. But you do not have to
reject tradition and belief to reap the benefits of integration into modern
society.
This was the central insight of Pakistan President Musharraf's speech on January
12th. And as President Bush recognized in his speech, the State of the Union,
all fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and
live free from poverty and violence. The United States will stand with people on
every continent, in Muslim societies and in all societies that seek to claim a
better future for their people.
Education will play a particularly important role in societies that are making
this quest. A good education teaches an appreciation of practical skills for the
global economy. But is also provides a forum in which one learns to live with
difference and to respect the rights of others. It fuels new hopes, instead of
old hatreds.
Americans have a deep understanding of the ability of education to open you up
to the full range of possibilities. At Stanford, I was always heartened to stand
before a class in which a fourth-generation Stanford legatee sat next to the son
or daughter of a migrant farm worker. It reinforced that education is the great
equalizer. Because after that experience, it would not matter where they came
from, it would matter where they were going.
Here at SAIS, there are not only diverse students from a collection of American
families, but also people from different backgrounds and from different
countries -- some 70 nations. The common experience shared here by students,
many of whom will go on to leadership roles here and in their own countries,
will influence choices for a long, long time to come. And choices are important.
Our continued success in the fight against terror, our success in making the
world safer and better hinges on the choices made by the rest of the world.
America cannot impose its vision on the world -- yet, we will use our influence
to favor freedom. There are right and wrong choices and right and wrong acts.
And governments are making them every day for their own people and for the
people of the world. We can never let the intricacies of cloistered debate --
with its many hues of gray and nuance -- obscure the need to speak and act with
moral clarity. We must recognize that some states or leaders will choose
wrongly. We must recognize that truly evil regimes will never be reformed. And
we must recognize that such regimes must be confronted, not coddled.
Nations must decide which side they are on in the fault line that divides
civilization from terror. They must decide whether to embrace the paradigm of
progress: democracy and freedom and human rights, and clean limited government.
Together, with others, we can help people and nations make positive choices as
they seek a better future, and we can deter those who want to take away a better
future for others.
September 11th reintroduced America to a part of itself that some had forgotten,
or that some thought we no longer had. We have been reminded that defending
freedom was not just the work of the greatest generation, it is the work of
every generation. And we will carry this better part of ourselves out into the
wider world.
Thank you very much.
MR. SZABO: Thank you so much for that superb lecture. I know the faculty really
appreciated the use of theory in your lecture. The students were
grimacing, but I think they also --
We're going to open the questions up to the SAIS community, and I have two
questions that I will intersperse at some point that we have from Bologna, but
let's open it to some students. We have one shy student in the front here who
will ask the first one.
Q The Bush administration, in your speech you use a lot of moral dichotomies --
there's a fault line, there's the good, the evil. But it seems that the
realities of foreign policy are much more complicated than that and America has
to engage with some regimes that are either anti-democratic, like Saudi Arabia,
or with dubious moral records, Israel. And I think the recent kind of silence
regarding the coups in Venezuela shows that it's not always 100 percent for
pro-democratic regimes as well.
I was wondering if you feel that this moral rhetoric, but combined with actions
that obviously have to serve our self-interest, create a perception of hypocrisy
and threaten America's credibility with our allies and internationally.
DR. RICE: Thank you. No, I don't. That won't surprise you.
No, it's a very good question. Look, the truth of the matter is, though, unless
you know where you're going, unless you're clear about where you're going, you
will go nowhere. And what moral clarity gives you is a compass against which to
measure everything else -- because you're right, it is a complex world, it's a
hard world. The complexities bring you into different kinds of situations in
which different tactics are important.
But if you ever lose sight of what you think is wrong and what is right, then
you have nothing to guide you. And if you ever lose sight of the fact that there
is wrong and right, you have nothing to guide you.
I would cite, for instance, the American struggle for which Paul Nitze is known
against the Soviet Union. It is absolutely clear that we "engaged" the Soviet
Union. We entered into large-scale arms control talks and treaties with the
Soviet Union to keep from blowing each other up. But we knew the character of
the Soviet Union and so we also made certain that we always made room to try and
engage around the government of the Soviet Union to people in the Soviet Union.
One of the most interesting aspects of the end of the Cold War, the periods of
between '88 and '91, was the degree to which a lot of people who had been a part
of exchanges with the United States, scholarly exchanges and others, emerged
from that to be the voice of a new liberalism in the Soviet Union when
conditions permitted.
Now, we have to do the same thing now. The fact is that when you are engaging
with a state that, shall we say, has not yet met the test democratically, you
have to say so. I was recently in a meeting with the President, with a central
Asian leader, with Karimov, in which he said to him, yes, I appreciate what
you've done in the war on terrorism, this is terrific and we're glad that we
were able to deal with the IMU; our relationship will get stronger as you reform
economically and politically. And you can never leave those words out of any
such conversation.
Let me just speak briefly to Venezuela because, in fact, the United States did
speak out against anti-constitutional means both publicly and privately. We did
make very clear that we believe that democratically elected governments could
not be overthrown by extraconstitutional means. But the threat to democracy in
Venezuela didn't begin with those people in the streets. We have to remember
that Chavez also, in shutting down the press, for instance, was doing things to
harm Venezuelan democracy long before that fateful outcome.
Now, we're all very hopeful that what he has said -- which is that he plans to
be self-reflective and the nation needs to be self-reflective -- will lead him
to recognize the importance of democratic values for real, not just claiming
that because you're elected you are exercising democratic values. We cannot fall
into that trap. When people are elected, they especially have a responsibility
to follow democratic values and we have to call it for what we see. But we were
very strong in this and, in fact, joined with countries in the region to talk
about the importance of respecting democratic processes.
Q President Bush has said Iran is part of the axis of evil. However, in the last
few years, countries like Italy and Germany have pursued a fruitful open-door
policy in regard to Tehran. Do you think that a more flexible and realist policy
by the U.S. towards Iran could be in the political and economic interests of the
U.S., itself.
DR. RICE: Well, I think that the problem with Iran is that its policies
unfortunately belie the notion that engagement with it has helped. It has been
engaged -- I mean, Great Britain has relations with Iran. A number of our
European allies have relations with Iran.
Our problem with Iran is in policies that are so destructive to international
politics -- from the support of terrorism around the world to the support of
terrorism in the Middle East and, frankly, the un-elected few in Iran who
continue to frustrate the hopes of their own people, who repeatedly turn out and
vote to throw off tyranny. There are an un-elected few who continue to frustrate
the hopes of the people. And we're simply speaking the truth about the nature of
Iran.
Now, the truth is we've had some useful interaction with Iran around
Afghanistan. Iran is Afghanistan's neighbor. We expect Iran to have good
relations with Afghanistan, but they need to be transparent relations, they
should be relations that are state to state, not relations that try to play into
the complex and difficult politics of Iran.
So I think that our view is that the behavior of Iran at this point would
suggest that it is a state that while there may be some positive forces within
it, those positive forces are not quite yet capable of changing the nature of
Iran's behavior; Iran's behavior continues to be a major problem in
international politics. And we watch the developments with great interest, but
Iranian behavior puts it squarely in the axis of evil -- whether it is weapons
of mass destruction or terrorism or any of those things. It's a complicated
situation, but I think the behavior speaks for itself.
Q I have a question about democracy being a compass. I understand that the idea,
the American foreign policy idea is to sort of influence the development of
democracies. However, some nations, it seems to me, may not be either ready or
on the verge of becoming democratic. And so if this is sort of pushed on them or
imposed it could create instability and chaos. And is there -- my first question
is, is there not a need to respect a pace at which democracy can actually be
established in certain countries?
And, second of all, if we look at reform, for example, in the former Soviet
Union, as well as China, and then we see that the fast pace at which reforms
occurred in the Soviet Union led to chaos and a bit of anarchy -- and, of
course, we see that in China, the progress is a lot slower -- do you think
there's a need for shock therapy? Is it better, is it better for preserving
stability?
DR. RICE: Thank you. It's a very good question. I would hate as a policymaker to
have to make the choice of who's ready for democracy and who isn't. And I think
that it is really not our responsibility to try and divide countries into, if
you will, tiers with whom you push democracy because they're kind of ready and
those that might not quite be ready because of chaos and instability.
First of all, whenever we've tried to do that, whenever we've tried to make
judgments about who's ready and who's not, we've almost always been wrong.
Because societies that -- particularly societies that are tyrannical are brittle
very often inside, and are opaque to us.
And so I think our better response is to be clear about the importance of
democratic development, to press the agenda on behalf of people whom from within
these societies are trying to bring about democratic change, to offer a hand to
those countries that are in transition and to provide tools that might help the
democratic transition.
You mentioned China. While none of us believe that just because China joined the
World Trade Organizations its democratic development is assured -- nobody
believes that -- but we do recognize that some of the things that China will do
as a part of its WTO membership -- whether it's rule of law or transparency or
giving greater economic freedom to entrepreneurs -- will change the political
landscape in China. So there are lots of different ways to go about this.
I do think we need to recognize, too, that just holding an election is not
democracy. It is a first step, but democratic consolidation takes some time. And
even mature democracies like our own take a long time to get all of the pieces
right. I'm often fond of saying, you know, when the Founding Fathers said "we,
the people" they didn't mean "me." And it's taken us a little while
to get that piece of it right.
So we should recognize that democracy is something that you build brick by
brick, step by step. But unless you recognize that it is a universal aspiration
of all people to be free, unless you recognize that given a choice between
tyranny and freedom people will choose freedom, you will always be surprised by
how much that is true. We just saw it again in Afghanistan. People said, well,
is Afghanistan after 20 years of civil war and Taliban, maybe they're not quite
ready. Yes, well, the democratic transition there is going to be hard. But if
you have any doubt that these people wanted to be freed from the tyranny of the
Taliban and that they want a chance at democratic development, you should just
talk to the many people now who are trying to help them get there.
So I don't think we should make those choices. I think we have to be firm in our
belief in the values, I think we have to press the values. And I think we have
to provide opportunities for leaders to make the right choices. Right now we are
fortunate in that many of the incentives are very powerful -- to give your
people greater creativity and greater freedom. Because the truth of the matter
is, economic development in the modern world is dependent on human potential.
And human potential does not flourish in tyrannies. And so the incentives to
freedom and to greater freedom are very strong. I think we have to press them.
As to China and Russia, I think I would read what happened in Russia a little
bit differently. Yes, it was chaotic and it was scary sometimes. But I would
never be one to say that the fact that political change preceded economic change
was a bad thing for Russia. Indeed, it may well be that when economic change now
begins to catch up that some of the political circumstances are stronger and
more in place. They've still got a very long way to go, and this consolidation
of democracy in Russia will take a very long time. But I have no doubt that the
political changes that created a kind of pluralism were for the good, not for
the bad.
Q I wanted to know, in your remarks today you said that regimes that coddled
terrorists will, in your words, be confronted and not coddled. The Palestinian
regime for the last several weeks has invited terrorists into their headquarters
-- and these are known individuals who have participated in assassinations --
and has given them safe haven.
How far does a regime have to go before it will meet that criteria and be
confronted and not coddled? Thank you very much.
DR. RICE: Well, we've been very clear with Chairman Arafat and with the
Palestinian Authority that we expect, and the world expects them to live up to
their responsibilities to rid themselves of any terrorist influences that may be
close to or associated with the Palestinian Authority.
We have even given them ways to do it. One of the things that we're doing in our
policy is to offer assistance to any leader who wishes to get rid of terrorism.
We're doing it with Shevardnadze in Georgia, we're doing it with Salih in Yemen,
and with the Palestinian Authority. That is essentially what the Tenet work plan
is -- it is a way to deal with the security environment and to arrest and to
bring to justice terrorists.
I don't think that there is any doubt in anyone's mind that we've not been fully
happy with the response -- we've been disappointed in the response. But the
context in the Middle East in which the war on terrorism cannot be fought solely
by military means and in which you need the cooperation of the states in the
region and you need the cooperation, indeed, of the Palestinian Authority to
fight terrorists, we're willing to keep trying and we are trying.
Now, the arrangement that was made over the weekend in which these prisoners are
being transferred and are going to be taken care of in a custodial fashion by
British and American wardens is one way to help move this process forward. But
let me be very clear. The President, when he made his speech on April 4th, was
more clear, or was clearer than any American President has been in a very, very
long time of what was expected of all the parties.
Peace in the Middle East is not easy. If it had been easy, we would have had it
by now. And the reason that it's not easy is that everybody in the region has to
do some difficult things in order to achieve it: Israel has to do difficult
things to come into conformity with 242 and 338, and to create the conditions
for a Palestinian state; the Arab neighbors of Israel have a lot of work to do
to bring about the condition for normalization of relations with Israel and to
make certain that terror is not incited from their own territories. It is simply
not acceptable to have some of the incitement of terror that you've had in the
Arab world, and we've made that very clear.
And, finally, the Palestinian Authority has a lot of work to do to actually meet
lead its people in a way that does not incite and does not give way to people's
concerns and people's hostilities but, rather, gives them another path toward
economic development and prosperity. It's a hard road for everybody, but we
believe that we've laid out a road map and we're going to pursue it step by
step.
Q To follow up on the question on morality. Iraq's current regime clearly
belongs to America's worst enemies. Its defense potential, however, might be
strengthened by some foreign leaders who also claim to be friends with the
United States. One of them, Ukrainian President Kuchma, had been allegedly taped
while agreeing to sell to Iraq four advanced air defense systems capable of
tracking stealth bombers. The tape with allegedly Kuchma's voice was
authenticated by American forensic experts. And U.S. military intelligence also
confirmed that Iraq, indeed, possesses such radar systems.
What measures is the United States government currently taking to investigate
this allegation? What consequences might Kuchma face if the allegations are
confirmed? And, more broadly, how should the United States deal with those
regimes who support its war against terror on words, but help its enemies in
deeds? Thank you.
DR. RICE: Sergei also was my research assistant at Stanford, so there's a little
bit of a Stanford/SAIS connection here. Hi, nice to see you.
Let me start, Sergei, with the last part of the question, which is how to
respond to regimes that are publicly or rhetorically supportive of the war on
terrorism and perhaps doing things that are not so helpful. And there are a
couple of things. First of all, we've been pretty clear with everybody that when
we discover that there is that inconsistency, that we expect the inconsistency
to be addressed, and that it would have very severe consequences for
U.S.-fill-in-the-blank relations if, in fact, that inconsistency is not
addressed.
In some cases, it has been a matter of saying to countries, all right, you may
not have the capacity to address terrorism in your own midst; maybe that's what
you're saying when you do nothing while saying you support the war on terrorism.
We will help you in those circumstances, and to offer intelligence and the like.
I have to say that for the most part, the number of countries in that category
is pretty small. We've been pretty impressed with the degree to which countries
are not just rhetorically supportive of, but actually supportive of the war on
terrorism. And I think there's a reason for that, which is that terrorism and
its ugly face is actually a threat to a lot of regimes, not just to us. And so
we've tended to get extremely good cooperation.
As to Ukraine, I don't want to comment on the specific example because there's a
lot that's gone on there and I don't want to comment on what is really still an
allegation. But I will say that we have talked very seriously to the Ukrainian
regime about some of the issues of proliferation that we are concerned about
with the Ukrainian regime.
We consider U.S.-Ukrainian relations to be potentially extremely important to
stability, particularly in southern Europe. Ukraine is a huge country, 50
million people. It's a country that borders on extremely important countries
like Russia, and it is a country that has a past of being able to cooperate with
the West in other periods of time -- a people that have been able to cooperate
with the West in other periods of time.
So we're seeking good relations. But we are -- we have let the Ukrainian
government know that the proliferation issues are extremely important not just
in the war on terrorism, but, for instance, in the Balkans, as well. We've been
very clear about that, and U.S.-Ukrainian relations will progress more strongly
when there's some action on some of those items.
Q I'm the Director of the Western Hemisphere Program at SAIS. Argentina is in a
profound crisis. It raises a number of very important security and economic
issues for the United States. Some would argue that if this were Turkey or
Brazil or Mexico, aid would have been forthcoming by now. Is there some point at
which we in Washington -- the "iffies" and the administration -- should really
call time out, the social crisis is increasing; the political polarization is
very deep, and provide economic support?
DR. RICE: Well, President Bush made very clear to President Duhalde not too long
after he came to power that Argentina is extremely important to the United
States and to the regional powers, and that we are going to be there for, and be
supportive of Argentina. The fact is, though, Argentina has to do some difficult
things. And Argentina is in very intense discussions with the IMF about how to
move forward. It has now taken a hiatus to go home and to try to see if it can
arrange politically to be able to do some of the things that it needs to be able
to do.
It is not an unwillingness to have international assistance go to Argentina. It
is an understanding that the conditions have to be right so that those resources
actually make a difference. And some of the things that Argentina needs to do
will improve confidence in Argentina just by doing them.
There was a huge disbursement of resources to Argentina, I believe $8 billion in
August. It did not stem the crisis because the conditions were not right. And so
it has to be a combination of willingness to provide resources, but also
understanding that circumstances are not always right in which resources will
make a difference.
Now, we are in constant contact with the Argentines. We fully believe that if
they can just do the things that the IMF is requesting that they do, we believe
that they can find a way back to sustainable growth. The President talks
frequently to other leaders in the region, as well, because we recognize that
this is not just U.S.-Argentina, this is about the whole hemisphere. But
Argentina has, and should know that it has no better friend than the United
States, and that it has a friend that will be willing to help and to advocate on
its behalf for resources at the time at which they would make a difference
toward sustainable growth. And that's where we are.
Q I'd like to go back to the Middle East again and ask you to comment on the
Abdallah plan. What is it that keeps us from giving it a full endorsement as the
beginning of a process to end Israeli terrorism and Palestinian terrorism?
DR. RICE: Thank you. The President had an opportunity this weekend, of course,
to be with Crown Prince Abdallah over an extended period of time. They not only
spent time in the kind of normal expanded -- well, it wasn't very expanded, it
was a small group to begin with -- but they spent a good deal of time alone,
talking about the future. And the President told the Crown Prince very strongly
how important he thought his leadership was in stepping up with a plan.
Every element of it may not be workable. Some of it would have to be negotiated
in terms of borders and the like. But we need to keep our eye on the big picture
here, and the promise of deeper Saudi engagement in the peace process would be a
tremendous breakthrough for the entire process.
The truth of the matter is that while we all focus very heavily on the
Israeli-Palestinian piece of this, this, of course, takes place in a regional
context. It takes place in the context in which Israel has to have security with
its neighbors; it has to have normal relations with its neighbors, like it has
with Egypt and Jordan. It needs to move to normal relations with the other Arab
states. And the Arab states, who also have a stake in the way that the
Israel-Palestinian issues are resolved, have to have a stake in the final
outcome of those negotiations.
So we believe that what the Saudi initiative most represents is a new impetus to
have Saudi engaged as Jordan and Egypt have been in bringing peace to the region
as a whole. And so we have been extremely positive about it; we've embraced the
concept in large parts of it. We understand that there are some things that
really are matters of negotiation. But we think it's a tremendously powerful
tool and extremely important step in this long-running conflict.
Thank you.
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